Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he notion that income taxes play an important role in the financing decisions of taxable corporations is well accepted from a theoretical and empirical point of view (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) . Because interest expense is deductible in computing a corporation's taxable income, there is a tax subsidy on debt financing that is positively related to the corporation's tax rate. Recent legislative and regulatory changes, however, have dramatically altered the business landscape, creating a proliferation of small businesses operating in organizational forms that are exempt from entitylevel income taxes, such as partnerships, limited liability companies, and Subchapter S corporations. These small businesses are often referred to as "flow-through" entities because their income is taxed only at the owner level.
1 The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of income taxes on the use of debt to shelter taxable income of small businesses operated as flow-through entities vis-à-vis taxable corporations.
We develop and test hypotheses that the effect of marginal income tax rates on the use of debt differs across both debt type (outside versus inside) and entity type (flow-through entities versus taxable corporations). Consistent with Dhaliwal, Trezevant, and Wang (1992) we represent debt utilization as the ratio of interest expense to taxable income before certain deductions. For taxable corporations (flow-through entities), tests are based on the estimated marginal tax rate of the corporation (entity's owner). Our analysis extends the literature on the effect of taxes on small business financing decisions in three ways. First, with respect to the utilization of "outside" debt (i.e., debt owed to non-owners), we predict and find a positive relation between marginal tax rates and debt utilization for both flowthrough entities and taxable corporations. The result for flow-through entities contradicts the conventional view that owners' tax rates have no effect on the use of debt by flow-through entities. Although owners can achieve the same after-tax results by lending (borrowing) in their personal account if entity-level debt is too high (too low), we speculate that significant non-tax costs prevent owners from creating the optimal amount of leverage in their individual accounts. Second, with respect to "inside" debt (i.e., debt owed to owners), we posit that the tax rates of owners will not influence debt utilization by flow-through entities because the deduction for interest expense on inside debt is offset by the interest income realized by the entities' owners. 2 Our test of this hypothesis is strengthened by performing a parallel analysis of taxable corporations for which we predict and find a positive relation between the corporation's marginal tax rates and inside debt utilization. Related to this result, we also find that flow-through entities tend to report higher pre-tax profits than taxable corporations. In combination, these results suggest that owners of taxable corporations use inside debt (and other payments to owners) to avoid the double taxation of corporate income. In addition to the obvious policy implications of this finding, these results also suggest that empirical studies of the tax planning behaviors of publicly traded firms do not necessarily generalize to closely held businesses (e.g., Guenther, 1992) .
Third, we test the tax substitution hypothesis (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) across combinations of entity type and type of debt. The substitution hypothesis posits that when additional tax shields are likely to lower the expected marginal tax rate, firms will substitute between debt and non-debt tax shields (MacKieMason, 1990) . 3 We test this hypothesis by interacting our tax rate variables with several types of non-debt expenses (i.e., officer compensation, depreciation, and rent expense). Because interest expense on inside debt is deductible for taxable corporations but has no tax advantages for flow-through entities, we predict and find a significant substitution effect on inside debt utilization for taxable corporations, but not for flow-through entities. In contrast, we expect and find evidence of substitution with respect to the use of outside debt by both types of entities.
The strength of our results is enhanced by testing predictions related to flowthrough entities across separate samples of partnerships and electing Subchapter S corporations (hereafter, S corporations). Although partnerships and S corporations are similar from a tax perspective (i.e., owners report their share of entity income annually on their individual income tax returns), their non-tax characteristics dif-fer greatly. As unincorporated entities, partnerships are typified by unlimited liability, termination upon the departure or death of a partner, and restrictions on the transfer of entity ownership. In contrast, S corporations are corporate entities with all the legal characteristics of taxable corporations (e.g., limited liability). 4 Testing our predictions across two types of flowthrough entities helps to rule out the possibility that our results might be confounded by entity characteristics other than taxes.
Our analyses are based on a sample of small businesses taken from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) conducted by the Federal Reserve Board. Cloyd, Limberg, and Robinson (1997) (hereafter, CLR) use data from a similar survey, the 1988-89 NSSBF, to examine the effect of taxes on the financing decisions of small, closely held corporations. CLR separately analyze S corporations and taxable corporations. Their results support a tax hypothesis that posits a positive relation between marginal tax rates and debt utilization for both taxable and flow-through businesses. Moreover, their results also support the tax substitution hypothesis. A significant limitation of CLR, however, is that their analysis did not distinguish between inside and outside debt. This limitation may explain why CLR do not document a difference in tax incentives to use debt across taxable and flow-through corporations. We predict and find that a difference does exist, but only with respect to inside debt. This paper proceeds as follows. The first section reviews prior research and develops the hypotheses. The second section describes our data and research method. The third section presents empirical results and the final section offers concluding comments. Modigliani and Miller (1963) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) analytically demonstrate the advantages of debt over equity financing that result from the tax deductibility of interest payments for taxable corporations. Two streams of empirical studies have emerged that address the tax advantages of debt for taxable corporations. The first stream attempts to identify a relation between corporations' marginal tax rates and their use of debt. The basic intuition is that corporations with higher marginal tax rates will, ceteris paribus, tend to use more debt because the deduction of interest expense reduces the after-tax cost of debt. Although empirical studies throughout the 1980s failed to produce reliable evidence that taxes affect financing decisions, more recent studies document this linkage. This evidence was made possible by a variety of improvements in research design, such as (1) examining incremental financing decisions (e.g., MacKie-Mason, 1990; Trezevant, 1992 Trezevant, , 1994 , (2) focusing on the ratio of interest expense to gross profit, rather than the debt-to-equity ratio (e.g., Dhaliwal, Trezevant, and Wang, 1992; CLR, 1997) , and (3) developing more refined measures of marginal tax rates (e.g., Graham, 1996; Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998) . All of these studies, with the exception of CLR, use samples of large, publicly traded corporations.
DEBT UTILIZATION BY TAXABLE AND FLOW-THROUGH ENTITIES
The second stream of studies predicts that taxable corporations will be more highly levered than partnerships. Scholes and Wolfson (1992, p. 376 ) explain the premise underlying these studies. Corporations are believed to receive a greater tax benefit for debt because the effective tax rate on corporate income exceeds the statutory tax rate for individuals. The effective rate on corporate income is higher than the rate on individuals because corporate income distributed to shareholders as dividends is subjected to doubletaxation. In other words, income is taxed at the corporate level when it is earned and is taxed again at the shareholder level when it is distributed as a dividend. In contrast, the income of a partnership or other flow-through entity (e.g., an S corporation) is taxed directly to the entity's owners (based on each owner's share of the entity's income). If the flow-through entity's owners are individual taxpayers, then the entity's income is taxed only once at the statutory tax rate for individuals. Hence, corporations are expected to use more debt than partnerships because the after-tax cost of debt is lower for corporations due to the higher effective tax rate applied to corporate income. Several studies have tested this hypothesis by comparing the capital structures of publicly traded corporations to those of publicly traded partnerships (MLPs). For example, Guenther (1992, p. 30) notes that corporations have higher debt-to-asset ratios than MLPs, which he attributes to the tax benefit corporations receive from interest expense. Similarly, Gentry (1994) reports that corporations have higher debt-tomarket value ratios than MLPs, lending support to his hypothesis that the corporate tax system encourages borrowing. Omer and Terando (1999) present another explanation of capital structure differences between corporations and MLPs. They suggest that when operating risks are high, general partners have an incentive to increase limited partner equity. This action reduces the liability of general partners by reducing overall debt in the partnership. Their evidence suggests that differences in business risks, as measured by the level of natural resource assets in the firm, is an alternative explanation for differences in the capital structure of MLPs and corporations. This result casts doubt on the conclusion that corporations are more highly levered than partnerships because of the double taxation of corporate profits.
The present study creates a link between the two streams of research discussed above. Like the first stream, we examine the relation between marginal tax rates and debt utilization by taxable corporations. Also, like the second stream, we investigate the differential impact of taxes on the debt utilization of taxable and flow-through entities. Unlike prior studies in the second stream, however, we do not compare directly the level of debt utilization across entity types. Instead, we employ the research design of studies in the first stream (i.e., regressing measures of debt utilization on tax rate variables) for each type of entity. Analyzing debt utilization across both S corporations and partnerships helps control for non-tax differences between incorporated and unincorporated entities. In addition to linking the two streams of empirical studies, this research establishes that taxes create similar incentives for both taxable corporations and flow-through entities. In other words, we present evidence that the double taxation of dividends is not a necessary condition for taxes to influence debt utilization.
To differentiate clearly the effect of taxation on the financing decisions of taxable and flow-through entities, we distinguish between outside debt and inside debt. Specifically, we contend that tax incentives differ across debt type as well as entity type. The analysis of debt type adds rigor to our study because we predict that tax incentives will not explain differences in the utilization of inside debt for flowthrough entities. In addition, this analysis provides insights into the use of inside debt to avoid the corporate tax because we also predict that tax incentives will explain differences in the utilization of inside debt for taxable corporations. Next, we develop our predictions related to outside debt, and then consider the effect of taxation on the use of inside debt.
Outside Debt
For both taxable and flow-through entities, we posit a direct relationship between the use of outside debt and the applicable marginal tax rate (i.e., the corporate marginal tax rate for taxable corporations and the owners' marginal tax rate for flow-through entities). As the marginal tax rate increases, the after-tax cost of outside debt decreases. Hence, we expect that the use of outside debt will be positively associated with the applicable tax rate for both taxable and flow-through entities. This "tax hypothesis" depends upon the tax savings generated by interest deductions. For taxable corporations, this tax savings reduces corporate tax payments. For flow-through entities, a tax savings occurs because the interest deductions are passed through to the owners of the business, thereby reducing the tax liabilities of the owners.
An alternative conjecture is that taxes have no impact on the financing decisions of flow-through entities. Owners of flowthrough firms can undo the tax impact of financing decisions made at the firm level by borrowing if firm-level debt is too little and lending if firm-level debt is too high. In the absence of impediments (non-tax costs) to borrowing at the owner level, it would be optimal for all debt to be held at the individual owner level because each owner could have a different expected marginal tax rate and, therefore, prefer a different level of debt. We do not expect this latter prediction to hold empirically for two reasons. First, the non-tax costs of leverage are likely to be higher when debt is at the owner-level rather than at the entity-level. This is particularly true for S corporations because shareholders may have difficulty borrowing when the corporation holds legal title to the assets. Second, most small businesses have only one or two owners, and when multiple owners do exist, they often tend to be members of the same family.
5 Therefore, the financial characteristics of owners, including marginal tax rates, are likely to be similar for each owner in the business. If the optimal amount of leverage is roughly constant across owners, then it may be more cost efficient to place the debt within the entity.
In addition to marginal tax rates affecting debt usage, the availability and level of other tax-deductible expenses (e.g., depreciation, rent, and compensation) may impact a firm's financing decisions (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) . Additional interest deductions reduce taxable income and eventually will reduce the marginal tax rate. Hence, the value of existing tax shields may be sensitive to the level of debt utilization (MacKie-Mason, 1990). 6 Taxpayers for whom the marginal tax rate is sensitive to the level of total tax shields are likely to substitute between debt and non-debt tax shields because overindulgence in either could reduce the expected tax benefits associated with both. CLR describe three groups of firms (owners in 5 This is true for the firms in our sample. The median (third-quartile) number of owners for both partnerships and S corporations is two (three). Members of the same family control (i.e., greater than 50 percent ownership) 46 percent of the partnerships and 80 percent of the S corporations in our sample. 6 Prior research (e.g., Trezevant, 1992) documents a tax substitution effect between investment tax shields (such as depreciation and rent expense) and debt tax shields for businesses facing a substantial probability of losing the immediate deductibility of tax shields. In our analysis, we include officers' compensation as an additional non-debt tax shield due to the relative ease with which small entities may manipulate these amounts to affect taxable income.
the case of flow-through entities) that are likely to vary in the extent to which they substitute between debt and non-debt tax shields. Tax exhausted firms produce so little taxable income that they (or their owners in the case of flow-through entities) face near zero tax rates regardless of their level of tax shields. On the other end of the spectrum, tax insatiable firms are those with so much taxable income that they (or their owners in the case of flowthrough entities) face the top statutory tax rate regardless of their level of tax shields. Tax sensitive firms lie between these two extremes such that additional tax shields will likely lower the applicable marginal tax rate, thereby reducing the tax benefits associated with existing tax shields. Consequently, tax sensitive firms are likely to substitute between debt and non-debt tax shields. CLR find that their sample of small businesses is dominated by tax exhausted and tax sensitive firms. In contrast, the results of studies using samples of large, publicly traded firms suggest that tax sensitive and tax insatiable firms dominate such samples. As our sample also consists of small businesses, we expect a result similar to that of CLR (i.e., substitution between debt and non-debt tax shields among firms in the upper end of the sample distribution of marginal tax rates). Specifically, as other available tax shields (e.g., depreciation, rent, and officers' compensation) increase, the positive effect of tax rates on utilization of outside debt will be mitigated (i.e., a negative coefficient on the interaction of other tax shields and marginal tax rates) for both taxable and flow-through entities. We refer to this prediction as the "substitution hypothesis" for outside debt.
Inside Debt
In contrast to outside debt, flowthrough and taxable entities have dramatically different incentives with respect to the use of inside debt. There is no tax advantage of using inside debt in a flowthrough entity because the interest paid by the entity to the owner will constitute taxable income to the owner. Consequently, the interest deduction allocated by the flow-through entity to the owner will only serve to cancel out the owner's taxable income. Hence, we expect to find no relationship between owners' marginal tax rates and the use of inside debt by S corporations or partnerships.
7 Similarly, because we expect the inside debt of flowthrough entities to be invariant to marginal tax rates, neither S corporations nor partnerships should exhibit any substitution between their use of inside debt and non-debt tax shields.
Taxable corporations, on the other hand, have an incentive to use inside debt because interest expense on such debt allows corporate profits to flow directly to the shareholders without a corporatelevel income tax.
8 Scholes and Wolfson (1992, p. 375) describe the strategy of replacing corporate equity with shareholder debt as one that effectively converts a taxable corporation into a partnership. In the limit, if all corporate income was offset by 7 Inside debt can be used to facilitate the deduction of losses for S corporations because shareholder loans create basis and amounts "at-risk" against which owners can deduct their share of firm losses. Consequently, loss firms may have more incentive to use inside debt relative to profitable firms. This incentive, however, only exists for firms whose owners have insufficient basis or amounts "at-risk" to deduct firm losses. Because we do not have information regarding owner basis or "at-risk" amounts, we are unable to test directly whether owners use inside debt to facilitate the deduction of firm losses by owners. Notwithstanding, in the discussion of results for the inside interest analysis we acknowledge that our results are consistent with this use of inside debt. 8 The potential use of inside debt to circumvent the corporate income tax is of great concern to the U.S. Treasuryinterest deductions generated by inside debt, then the corporate-level tax would be eliminated and the corporation's earnings would be taxed only once at the shareholder level. The benefit of avoiding the corporate tax is directly related to the magnitude of the corporation's marginal tax rate, and therefore, we predict that the use of inside debt will be positively related to the marginal tax rates of taxable corporations.
In addition to inside debt, taxable corporations may also pay compensation and rents to their shareholders in order to circumvent the corporate-level income tax. In fact, any direct payment to shareholders that is deductible by the corporation can be used to avoid the corporate tax. Nevertheless, because the receipt of compensation and rent represents taxable income to the shareholders, taxable corporations are unlikely to use such payments to drive their marginal tax rates to zero. Rather, the optimal amount of such deductions equates the effective marginal tax rate on corporate income with the owner's marginal tax rate.
9 Thus, as discussed earlier in the context of outside debt, taxable corporations whose marginal tax rates are sensitive to the overall level of tax shields are likely to substitute between interest expense on inside debt and other available tax shields so that their effective marginal tax rate does not fall below the owner's marginal tax rate. Therefore, we expect the relation between marginal tax rates and the use of inside debt by taxable corporations to be moderated by the level of other available tax shields.
Figure 1 summarizes our predictions with respect to the effect of marginal tax rates on the use of outside and inside debt by flow-through and taxable entities. In the next section, we describe the method used to test these predictions.
METHOD
We test the effect of taxes on the utilization of inside and outside debt by estimating two regression equations. In the first 
Flow-Through Entities Taxable Corporations

Outside Debt
Tax Hypothesis for Outside Debt: Effect of owner 's (corporation's) marginal tax rate on utilization of outside debt by flow-through entities (taxable corporations).
Substitution Hypothesis for Outside Debt:
Interactive effect of owner's (corporation's) marginal tax rate and non-debt tax shields on utilization of outside debt by flow-through entities (taxable corporations).
Inside Debt Tax Hypothesis for Inside Debt:
Effect of owner 's (corporation's) marginal tax rate on utilization of inside debt by flow-through entities (taxable corporations).
Substitution Hypothesis for Inside Debt:
Interactive effect of owner's (corporation's) marginal tax rate and non-debt tax shields on utilization of inside debt by flow-through entities (taxable corporations).
The effective marginal tax rate for a taxable corporation consists of the current marginal tax rate paid by the corporation plus the present value of any shareholder-level income taxes that will be paid on future dividends.
regression, equation [1] , outside debt utilization is represented as a function of tax rates, non-debt tax shields, and non-tax factors. In the second regression, equation [2] , inside debt utilization is represented as a function of tax rates, non-debt tax shields, and non-tax factors. 10 We estimate each of these regressions across each entity type (S corporation, partnership, and taxable corporation). Hence, we estimate a total of six regressions, three for outside debt utilization and three for inside debt utilization.
where:
OUTINT i = ratio of outside interest expense to taxable income before officers' compensation, depreciation, rent, and outside interest, INSINT i = ratio of inside interest expense to taxable income before officers' compensation, depreciation, rent, and inside interest, TAX i = the marginal tax rate (the corporate rate for taxable corporations and the individual rate for flow-through entities) on taxable income before interest expense, OCOMP i = officers' compensation deflated by taxable income before officers' compensation, depreciation, rent, and interest, DEPR i = depreciation deductions deflated by taxable income before officers' compensation, depreciation, rent, and interest, RENT i = rent deductions deflated by taxable income before officers' compensation, depreciation, rent, and interest, and X ki = firm-specific attributes representing non-tax determinants of debt utilization.
Dependent Measures
The dependent variables are computed using a two-step procedure. First, we allocate total interest expense between outside and inside debt based on the proportion of shareholder (or partner) loans to total debt on each firm's balance sheet. This allocation method assumes that the average interest rate paid by each firm is constant across both categories of debt.
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We use interest expense to proxy for debt utilization because, unlike debt ratios, interest expense provides a direct measure of debt tax shields (Dhaliwal, Trezevant, 10 The interest regressions are based upon the assumption that officer compensation, depreciation, and rent expense are exogenous to the determination of interest expense. Because officer compensation may also be modified in response to changes in tax rates or investment tax shields (e.g., depreciation and rent expense), we repeated our analyses allowing for the simultaneous determination of interest expense and officer compensation expense. We describe these results with other sensitivity tests in the results section of the paper. 11 The correlation between OUTINT and INSINT is .13 (p = .00) among taxable corporations, .12 (p = .00) among S corporations, and .06 (p = .34) among partnerships. Similarly, the correlation between the residuals from the regression analyses of OUTINT and INSINT is 0.08 (p = .00) for taxable corporations, 0.03 (p = .37) for S corporations, and 0.12 (p = .07) for partnerships. Pooling across entity types, the correlation between the residuals is 0.03 (p = .08). The small magnitudes of these correlation coefficients suggest that the independent analysis of each dependent measure is justified. 12 Some support for this assumption is provided by Internal Revenue Code §7872 that requires the imputation of interest expense at a market rate of interest on loans between corporations and their shareholders when existing loan terms call for a below-market rate of interest. 
Tax and Tax Substitution Variables
We construct an interval-level measure of the marginal tax rate (TAX) on interest deductions based upon taxable income before interest expense. For the outside (inside) debt regressions, TAX is based on taxable income before outside (inside) interest expense. For each taxable corporation, we estimate this marginal tax rate measure by applying the corporate tax rate schedule for the fiscal year to each firm's pre-interest taxable income. Basing TAX on taxable income before interest expense reduces the potential for endogeneity between TAX and the dependent variables.
For each S corporation and partnership, we estimate the marginal tax rate measure by applying the appropriate individual income tax rate to the share of preinterest taxable income accruing to the largest shareholder or partner.
13
Where there was no single individual shareholder or partner holding a 20 percent or more ownership interest, we used the average ownership percentage to determine the proportionate share of preinterest taxable income for the average shareholder or partner. We used the married-joint rates for the calendar year in which the entity's fiscal year ends because partners and S corporation shareholders are deemed to earn their share of entity income on the last day of the entity's fiscal year. Unfortunately the survey did not request information about loss carryovers, or other items of income and expense that might be included on individual shareholder or partner income tax returns. Consequently, our measure of the marginal tax rate applicable to flow-through entities is based upon the assumption that owners' marginal tax rates can be adequately inferred from the amount of taxable income generated 13 For example, a partnership with $100,000 of pre-interest taxable income in 1992 and two partners, each owning 50 percent of the partnership, would have TAX = 0.28. That is, each partner's share of partnership income is $50,000, and the marginal tax rate at this level of taxable income using the 1992 "married filing jointly" tax schedule is 28 percent. If one of the two partners held a majority interest, TAX would be based on the majority owner's share of partnership profits using the married filing jointly marginal tax rate for the majority partner. To determine if our regression results are sensitive to this specification of TAX, we performed sensitivity analyses with TAX set to one for S corporations and partnerships with positive pre-interest taxable income, and zero otherwise. Although this dichotomous measure of marginal tax rates is unsophisticated, firms are less likely to be misclassified under this scheme because S corporations and partnerships with positive pre-interest taxable income are not further stratified into multiple tax rate categories. Results using this alternative specification are qualitatively similar to those presented in Tables 6 and 7. by the entity. 14 Descriptions of the tax variables are summarized in Panel B of Table 1 .
Measures of non-debt tax shields in prior research have either been based upon all non-debt deductions (CLR) or specific financial expenses, such as depreciation (Graham, 1996) , rent (Trezevant, 1992) and research expenditures (Trezevant, 1994) . Our proxies for nondebt tax shields reflect three types of expenses for which we have information 14 The omission of other sources of income and deductions for owners of flow-through entities will understate taxable income in some cases and overstate taxable income in other cases. Of flow-through entities in our sample, 36.2 percent have TAX values less than the maximum statutory income tax rate applied to individual taxpayers for the applicable tax year, which provides some basis for assessing the extent to which TAX values, on average, might be understated. However, to the extent that owner 's tax rates cannot be inferred from the entity's income, our empirical measure is a noisy proxy for owners' true marginal tax rates and, consequently, our tests are less likely to support the tax and substitution hypotheses for outside debt for flow-through entities.
and that are susceptible to tax planning: officers' compensation (OCOMP) 15 , depreciation (DEPR), and rent (RENT). Each of these represents the total expenses of that category (e.g., officers' compensation) deflated by taxable income before officers' compensation, rent, depreciation, and either outside or inside interest expense (depending upon the regression, see Table  1 , Panel C). We test the substitution effect by creating multiplicative interaction terms between TAX and each of these non-debt expenses. With regard to the outside debt regressions for both taxable and flow-through entities, we expect the coefficient for each interaction term (i.e., TAX*OCOMP, TAX*DEPR, and TAX*RENT) to be negative. 16, 17 Additionally, because inside interest is deductible for taxable corporations, we expect similar results for the inside debt regression for taxable corporations. Because inside interest expense has no tax advantages for flow-through entities, we do not anticipate tax substitution between inside interest and non-debt tax shields for partnerships and S corporations.
Control Variables
Although the focus of this paper is the influence of tax status on debt utilization, it is important to control for the non-tax determinants of debt utilization. Therefore, we include a number of control variables that other researchers have found to be significant in the analysis of debt utilization. We briefly discuss each control variable below, and refer the reader to Auerbach (1985) , MacKie-Mason (1990) , Jensen and Meckling (1998) , and Titman and Wessels (1988) , all of whom provide excellent surveys of the literature related to these variables.
We include OCOMP, DEPR, and RENT to control for any main effects that officer compensation, depreciation, and rent may have on debt utilization. We expect that DEPR will be positively associated with debt utilization as more depreciable assets generate both more depreciation expense and more collateral to secure debt. We do not have directional predictions for OCOMP and RENT but include these variables to ensure that the estimated effects of TAX*OCOMP or TAX*RENT are not due to any main effects of OCOMP and RENT.
A firm's profitability and liquidity are likely to be negatively related to debt utilization for two reasons. First, profitable and highly liquid firms probably have more internally generated funds and, therefore, less need for debt than other firms. Second, when these firms do borrow, they likely pay lower interest costs than less profitable or less liquid firms due to a lower risk of default. We measure 15 For partnerships, officers' compensation represents the amount of guaranteed payments made to partners and deducted by the partnership as a current period expense. 16 Recall that the prediction of a negative coefficient on the tax substitution variables is based on the assumption that our sample of small businesses is dominated by tax exhausted and tax sensitive firms, and contains relatively few tax insatiable firms (i.e., firms with such high levels of taxable income that additional tax shields have no effect on their marginal tax rates). As a practical matter, it is difficult to differentiate between tax sensitive and tax insatiable firms using data for only one year because taxable income varies across time. Nevertheless, the distribution of taxable income among sample firms appears to support the assumption that our sample contains relatively few tax insatiable firms. For taxable corporations, the median taxable income is only $52,647. Among flow-through entities, the median taxable income allocable to the largest shareholder (partner) is $41,028 ($14,505) for S corporations (partnerships). 17 The negative coefficient on the interaction between TAX and non-debt shields arises because (1) for a given tax rate, substitution predicts that an increase in non-debt shields will lead to less debt shields; and (2) for a given level of non-debt shields, substitution predicts a more pronounced decrease in debt shields for relatively high tax firms because the relatively high tax firms in our sample (i.e., tax-sensitive firms) are more sensitive to the level of non-debt shields than the relatively low tax firms in our sample (i.e., tax-exhausted firms).
profitability as the ratio of taxable income before interest expense to gross assets (ROA) and liquidity as the ratio of cash to gross assets (LIQ). Petersen and Rajan (1994) report that the age of a firm may be negatively related to debt utilization because older firms have had more time to generate funds internally while younger firms may have more investment opportunities. We represent the age of the firm as the natural log of the number of years (plus one) the firm has been in business (LNA). We also include a measure of default risk (DRISK) to represent the inherent risk of lending to firms in certain industries. DRISK is based on the frequency of business failures within each firm's two-digit SIC code. We are unable to make a directional prediction as to the effect of DRISK on OUTINT. The relationship would be negative if outside lenders are less willing to loan funds to firms in risky industries. On the other hand, the relation would be positive if outside lenders make loans to such firms, but only at higher interest rates. With respect to inside debt, we expect the relation between DRISK and INSINT to be positive because, holding capital requirements constant, higher default risk should make outside debt either less available or more expensive which, in either case, would make inside debt more likely. In addition, owners may also charge the firm a higher interest rate, especially when debt is not proportional to stock ownership. Finally, several additional control variables are included in our sensitivity analyses and discussed in the results section.
Sample Selection
Our sample is comprised of firms included in the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances. This survey was conducted during 1994 and 1995 under the guidance of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Small Business Administration. The Appendix includes an explanation of the survey questions underlying the variables used in this study. The full sample of survey firms includes 3,083 non-financial, non-farm businesses with fewer than 500 employees. We eliminated the following firms from our sample:
1. publicly held corporations, 2. firms with missing observations for key variables, 3. firms with negative income before debt and non-debt tax shield deductions, 4. firms with extreme ratios.
The first criterion insures that sample firms are closely held. This restriction increases the likelihood that firms in our taxable corporation subsample are similar to those in the S corporation and partnership subsamples in terms of ownership structure and capital market considerations. The second criterion eliminates firms with missing balance sheet or income statement information. Because we scale dependent and independent variables by taxable income before interest, officer compensation, rent, and depreciation expense, the third criterion excludes firms with negative values for this denominator. The fourth and final criterion eliminates firms with extreme observations. An extreme observation was defined as a value in excess of five for officers' compensation (OCOMP), depreciation (DEPR), or rent (RENT).
18 The application of these criteria, described in Panel A of Table 2 , produced a sample of 2,618 18 We eliminate these observations because a small denominator (i.e., profit before compensation, rent, depreciation, and outside or inside interest expense) has a disproportionate effect on the value of the variable (i.e., a slight change in the numerator causes a very large shift in the value of the ratio). Results are qualitatively similar if we choose a more extreme cut-off (e.g., 10) or "winsorize" extreme values to 5.
firms for the analysis of outside interest and 2,581 firms for the analysis of inside interest. Panel B of Table 2 reports the distribution and relative frequencies of our sample firms by entity type, and Table 3 presents the distribution of sample firms across major industry groupings. The distribution of firms across industries is virtually identical between the taxable corporation and S corporation subsamples. The partnership subsample, however, is distributed somewhat differently than either the corporation or S corporation subsamples. While relatively more partnerships are engaged in the service and insurance industries than either taxable corporations or S corporations, there are relatively fewer partnerships in the manufacturing, wholesale, and retail industries. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for pre-interest taxable income and all variables used in the regression analyses for the overall sample and for each firm-type subsample. Statistically significant differences between the subsamples with respect to these variables are noted in the table, and the more interesting differences are discussed here.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The level of outside interest (OUTINT) does not vary significantly between entity types. The level of inside interest (INSINT), however, is less for partnerships than for either type of corporation. The higher level of inside debt for taxable corporations relative to partnerships is consistent with prior research documenting that corporations generally are higher levered than partnerships (e.g., Guenther, 1992; Gentry, 1994; and Omer and Terrando, 1999) . Nonetheless, we do not have cross-entity predictions for the level of outside or inside interest. With respect to tax rates (TAX), the average marginal tax rate is higher for taxable corporations than for S corporations or partnerships. This difference is probably due to the fact that the TAX variable for flowthrough entities is computed by dividing the income among multiple owners and applying the tax rate schedules applicable to individuals, whereas the income of taxable corporations is undivided and subjected to the corporate tax rate schedule. Average ROA is significantly lower for taxable corporations than partnerships. The higher profitability relative to the asset base of partnerships might be explained by the greater concentration of partnerships in service industries. Nevertheless, S corporations are also more profitable, on average, than taxable corporations. In addition, taxable corporations have higher values of OCOMP, on average, than firms in the two flow-through subsamples. These differences do not appear to be related to business causes, especially since the industry mix of the taxable and S corporation samples is nearly identical.
19 Instead, this evidence is consistent with two possible tax-related explanations. First, taxable corporations may distribute earnings to their owners in ways that are deductible at the corporate level, such as paying out relatively more compensation to officers, in order to mitigate the impact of the corporate income tax. Second, with respect to comparisons between taxable and S corporations, S corporations may pay their shareholder-employees artificially low levels of compensation in order to avoid payroll taxes.
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These findings contrast with those of Guenther (1992, p. 33) Because OCOMP is the ratio of officers' compensation to taxable income before officer's compensation, rent, depreciation, and interest expense (see Table 1 , Panel C), it is not evident that firm size would explain differences in OCOMP across firm type. Nevertheless, to investigate whether differences in OCOMP are explained by firm size, we pooled all firms and regressed OCOMP on two indicator variables (SCORP was coded one for S corporations and zero otherwise, PSHIP was coded one for partnerships and zero otherwise) and the book value of assets. Because taxable corporations have values of zero on both indicator variables, they serve as the reference group. Consistent with the univariate results for OCOMP, the coefficients on SCORP (-0.05, t = -4.607) and PSHIP (-0.20, t = -10.59) are significantly negative, indicating that taxable corporations expend a higher percentage of their income on officer's compensation than either type of flow-through entity after controlling for firm size. 20 Payroll taxes create an incentive for S corporation shareholder-employees to receive artificially low levels of compensation because shareholder-employee compensation is subject to payroll tax whereas the shareholderemployee share of S corporation profits is not subject to payroll tax. master limited partnerships tend to be less profitable than publicly-traded corporations, a result which he attributes to the higher non-tax costs of operating in the partnership form. The directional difference between our findings and those of Guenther illustrates that empirical findings based on samples of publicly traded firms do not necessarily generalize to closely held firms. Publicly traded corporations are more constrained in their abilities to reduce taxable income due to (1) the divergent interests of a large group of shareholders and (2) investors' focus on financial accounting earnings per share. Finally, average DRISK is significantly higher for both taxable corporations and S corporations than partnerships. This finding is consistent with firms' use of the corporate form to mitigate risks associated with business failures (Ayers, Cloyd, and Robinson, 1996) . Panels A, B, and C in Table 5 present simple correlations among the dependent and independent variables for the taxable corporation, S corporation, and partnership subsamples, respectively. For each subsample, OUTINT is negatively correlated with TAX but there is no consistent pattern of correlation between OUTINT and the tax substitution variables. These correlations suggest that univariate statistics may not be sufficient to test the tax and tax substitution hypotheses. Further, OUTINT is correlated with OCOMP, DEPR, and ROA for each subsample, which reiterates the need to control for these constructs in multivariate analyses.
who finds that
Similar to OUTINT, INSINT is also negatively correlated with TAX for each subsample. With respect to tax substitution variables, however, INSINT is negatively correlated with TAX*OCOMP and TAX*RENT for taxable corporations but not correlated with the tax substitution variables for the S corporation and partnership subsamples. These correlations are generally consistent with our expectations for the tax substitution hypotheses For purposes of these correlations, these variables were deflated by taxable income before outside interest and nondebt tax shields. For the inside debt regressions, these variables are deflated by taxable income before inside interest and nondebt tax shields. Correlations computed using these variables deflated by taxable income before inside interest are qualitatively similar to those reported. Outside Debt Table 6 presents the results of estimating the outside interest regressions.
21 All three estimated regressions exhibit significant explanatory power. The tax hypothesis for outside debt posits a positive relation between marginal tax rates and utilization of outside debt for both taxable corporations and flow-through entities. Consistent with this hypothesis, the regression coefficients for TAX (α 1 ) are significantly positive for taxable corporations, S corporations, and partnerships. Further, given the coefficients and values for TAX and the tax substitution variables, the average effect of tax rates on OUTINT is also positive for all three entity types.
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For a firm at the sample mean, an increase in the marginal tax rate of 1 percentage point (e.g., from 34 percent to 35 percent) is associated with 1.45, 0.88, and 4.27 percent increase in OUTINT for taxable corporations, S corporations, and partnerships, respectively.
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The substitution hypothesis for outside debt is that, for both taxable corporations and flow-through entities, the positive relation between expected marginal tax rates and outside debt utilization will decrease as the level of other available tax shields increases. This hypothesis would be supported by significant negative regression coefficients for the three tax substitution variables (i.e., α 2 , α 3 , and α 4 ) for 21 Regression results for the analysis of outside debt are based on the final sample after the removal of influential observations identified using Belsley et. al., (1980) procedures. These procedures identified 1.9 percent, 0.7 percent and 2.6 percent of the taxable corporation, S corporation, and partnership observations, respectively, as influential. Results based on the final sample including extreme observations are qualitatively similar to those presented. 22 The average effect of tax rates on OUTINT is determined by summing the products of the individual mean values for TAX, TAX*OCOMP, TAX*DEPR, and TAX*RENT with their respective regression coefficients. For purposes of this analysis, mean values are calculated using the 1,407 taxable corporations, 943 S corporations, and 228 partnership observations employed in Table 6 . We also computed the estimated net effect of taxes on debt utilization for each sample firm by summing the products of the individual firm values for TAX, TAX*OCOMP, TAX*DEPR, and TAX*RENT with their respective regression coefficients. Results of this estimation suggest that the net effect of taxes on debt utilization is positive for 87 percent, 86 percent, and 92 percent of the taxable corporation, S corporation, and partnership subsamples, respectively. The remaining sample firms represent taxable corporations (flow-through entities) with an estimated corporate (owner) pre-interest marginal tax rate of zero. 23 We computed the effect of a change in average marginal tax rates on OUTINT by comparing the mean value of OUTINT, holding all variables constant at their mean values, with the predicted value of OUTINT after a 1 percentage point increase in TAX. We have no reliable explanation for why the estimated coefficient on TAX is larger for partnerships than for the other two firm types. We speculate that because many partnerships are structured to maximize tax benefits (e.g., through special allocations of income or loss items to different partners), their owners may be more sensitive to tax matters than the owners of corporate entities. However, it should also be noted that our sample of partnerships is considerably smaller than either corporate sample and, despite elimination of influential observations (Belsley et. al., 1980) , the regression results for the partnership sample may be less representative of the population.
each of the three firm types. As shown in Table 6 , eight of the nine estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant (p ≤ .03). These results provide strong support for the substitution hypothesis. Three of the control variables are consistently significant across the three entity types. First, DEPR is positively related to outside debt utilization in all three regressions. This variable reflects debt securability-more depreciable assets generate both more depreciation expense and more collateral to secure outside loans. Second, more profitable firms have less outside interest expense, as indicated b Probability levels are determined using one-tailed tests for variables with directional predictions. All other probability levels are determined using two-tailed tests. Estimation results are after removing the effects of influential observations as defined by application of the procedures in Belsley et. al. (1980) . Observations for 27 taxable corporations, seven S corporations, and six partnerships were classified as influential. Inclusion of these observations produces qualitatively similar results.
by the significantly negative coefficients on ROA across all three entity types. This result suggests that more profitable businesses make less use of outside debt, perhaps because they are able to finance projects with internally generated capital. Third, the significant negative coefficients for LNA indicate older firms have less outside interest expense. This result is consistent with older firms having accumulated more internally generated funds (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) , and with newer firms having a higher demand for capital.
Other control variables are significant in the analysis of outside debt utilization for some but not all firm types. For example, the coefficient for LIQ is significantly negative in the taxable corporation and S corporation subsamples, suggesting that firms with more liquid assets use less outside debt. The coefficient for DRISK is significantly negative in the S corporation subsample only, suggesting that more risky firms use less outside debt, perhaps because it is more difficult for these firms to attract outside lenders. Finally, the estimated coefficients for OCOMP and RENT are positive and statistically significant for the taxable corporation subsample, indicating that taxable corporations with high levels of outside debt also tend to have high levels of officer compensation and rent expense. To the extent that officer compensation and rent are paid to shareholders of these closely held firms, this result is consistent with the use of these expenditures to avoid the double-tax on corporate income (after controlling for the substitution effect and holding the tax rate constant). Table 7 presents the results of estimating the inside interest regressions. 24 The tax and substitution hypotheses for inside debt in taxable corporations are the same as the hypotheses for outside debt. That is, the regression coefficient on TAX (β 1 ) is expected to be positive while the regression coefficients on the tax substitution variables (β 2 , β 3 , and β 4 ) are expected to be negative. In contrast, the tax and tax substitution hypotheses hold that these same regression coefficients will not be significantly different from zero for S corporations and partnerships.
Inside Debt
The regression results for inside debt utilization are consistent with our expectations. For taxable corporations, β 1 is significantly positive and two of the three estimated coefficients for the tax substitution variables (TAX*OCOMP and TAX*RENT) are significantly negative. Further, the average effect of tax rates on INSINT is also positive.
25 For a taxable corporation at the sample mean, an increase in the marginal tax rate of 1 percentage point (e.g., from 34 percent to 35 24 As in the outside debt analysis, regression results for the analysis of inside debt are based on the final sample after the removal of influential observations identified using Belsley et. al. (1980) procedures. These procedures identified 1.1 percent, 1.7 percent, and 2.3 percent of the taxable corporation, S corporation, and partnership observations, respectively, as influential. Results based on the final sample including extreme observations are qualitatively similar to those presented. 25 As in the outside debt analysis, the average effect of tax rates on INSINT is determined by summing the products of the individual mean values for TAX, TAX*OCOMP, TAX*DEPR, and TAX*RENT with their respective regression coefficients. For purposes of this analysis, mean values are calculated using the 1,406 taxable corporations employed in Table 7 . We also computed the estimated net effect of taxes on debt utilization for each sample taxable corporation by summing the products of the individual firm values for TAX, TAX*OCOMP, TAX*DEPR, and TAX*RENT with their respective regression coefficients. Results of this estimation suggest that the net effect of taxes on debt utilization is positive for 82 percent of the sample taxable corporations. The remaining taxable corporations are those with an estimated corporate pre-interest marginal tax rate of zero. For inside debt for S corporations and partnerships, there is no significant tax effect on debt as evidenced in b Probability levels are determined using one-tailed tests for variables with directional predictions. All other probability levels are determined using two-tailed tests. Estimation results are after removing the effects of influential observations as defined by application of the procedures in Belsley et. al. (1980) . Observations for 27 taxable corporations, seven S corporations, and six partnerships were classified as influential. Inclusion of these observations produces qualitatively similar results.
additional tax shields will reduce the corporation's marginal tax rate.
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In contrast, there is no tax incentive for flow-through entities to use inside debt because the inside interest expense is offset by the related interest income on the owner's individual tax return. Consistent with this conjecture, none of the eight regression coefficients on TAX and the tax substitution variables in the regressions for S corporations and partnerships are significantly different from zero. Further, an F-test of the joint hypotheses that the three tax substitution coefficients are jointly equal to zero is also insignificant for the S corporation (F = 0.39, p = .76) and partnership (F = 1.58, p = .20) subsamples.
While these results support the hypothesis that the use of inside debt by flowthrough entities is unrelated to marginal tax rates, this finding does not necessarily indicate the absence of tax-related motivations for the use of inside debt by these firms. Specifically, shareholders may make inside loans to S corporations in order to establish basis against which they can deduct their share of S corporation losses on their individual tax returns. Unlike general partners in partnerships, S corporation shareholders do not get tax basis for outside debts. Although an empirical test of such motivation for using inside debt is beyond the scope of this paper, this use of inside debt to establish shareholder tax basis may explain the marginally significant negative coefficient on TAX in the S corporation subsample. In other words, if low tax rates are indicative of historical losses by these firms, then the use of inside debt by S corporations may be increasing as losses accumulate.
By their very nature, inside loans to closely held businesses are often not "arm's length" transactions. Consequently, the decision to make an inside loan may be based more on the tax objectives of the parties than on considerations such as debt securability or profitability. Consistent with this, several of the control variables that are significant in the analysis of outside debt are not consistently significant in the analysis of inside debt. As discussed earlier, inside debt is less pervasive than outside debt across all firm types, and is present in only about 12 percent of the partnership subsample. The relatively infrequent use of inside debt by partnerships is consistent with the tax hypothesis for these firms. An alternative explanation for the lack of significant tax effects in the analysis of INSINT for partnerships is that, due to the low frequency of inside debt, there is insufficient variation in the dependent variable to permit a powerful test of the hypothesis. We address these concerns in the sensitivity analyses discussed in the following section.
Sensitivity Analysis
We conducted several additional analyses to investigate the sensitivity of the results presented in Tables 6 and 7 . First, to address potential statistical problems due to the low variation of INSINT in the partnership subsample and because the hypothesized effects of marginal tax rates are the same across S corporations and partnerships, we repeated the regression analyses discussed above on a pooled sample of these firms. The results of these analyses are qualitatively similar to those 27 From a comparison of the results for taxable corporations in Table 6 to those in Table 7 , it would appear that tax rates may have a greater effect on the utilization of outside debt than on the utilization of inside debt. Although we predict a positive effect in both cases, we make no prediction about the relative magnitude of this effect across types of debt. We speculate that the relatively smaller coefficient on TAX in the analysis of inside debt may be due to non-tax frictions that limit the ability of firms to use inside debt, such as resource constraints that limit a shareholder's ability to make inside loans, or incentive problems that can arise when some shareholders make loans to the corporation while others do not.
reported above. Specifically, TAX and the three tax substitution variables are significant in the predicted directions in the analysis of OUTINT, but are insignificant in the analysis of INSINT.
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Second, because prior research (e.g., Graham et. al., 1998) suggests that firm size may be related to debt utilization, we performed the analyses in Tables 6 and 7 including the log of firm assets as a proxy for firm size. Results from these analyses are not qualitatively different from those presented in the tables. Third, we conduct collinearity diagnostics for all six regression analyses presented in Tables 6 and 7 . The highest condition indices for each analysis range from 16 to 18, which is well below the upper bound of 30 suggested by Belsley et. al. (1980) as problematic. Therefore, we conclude that the regression results are not materially affected by multicollinearity.
Fourth, our interest regressions are based upon the assumption that officer compensation, depreciation, and rent expense are exogenous to the determination of interest expense. Trezevant (1992 Trezevant ( , 1994 reports evidence that firms may modify tax shields in response to changes in tax regimes and in conjunction with changes in other tax shields (e.g., depreciation and rent expense). To address the possibility that our sample firms might modify both debt and compensation tax shields simultaneously we repeated our analyses allowing for the simultaneous determination of interest expense and officer compensation expense (i.e., using two-stage leastsquares estimation). For these regressions, TAX is based on taxable income before outside (inside) interest expense and compensation expense. Exogenous variables for the officer compensation equation included TAX, TAX*DEPR, TAX*RENT, DEPR, RENT, ROA, number of employees, sales, total assets, and either OUTINT or INSINT. Substitution hypotheses were tested using the variables TAX*DEPR and TAX*RENT. Results from this analysis are consistent with those reported in Tables 6  and 7 . Specifically, the regression coefficients for TAX (TAX*DEPR and TAX*RENT) are significantly positive (negative) for the outside debt analysis for each subsample and for the inside debt analysis for taxable corporations. In the analysis of inside debt for the S corporation and partnership subsamples, the coefficients for TAX, TAX*DEPR, and TAX*RENT are insignificant as expected.
Finally, prior research suggests that industry membership may be related to debt utilization due to differences in production technologies across industries (Dammon and Senbet, 1988) or the degree of regulation (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 1984) . To assess the impact of industry membership, we reran the regression analyses including dummy variables representing industry membership. Again, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the tables.
CONCLUSION
This study makes several important contributions to the literature investigating the effect of taxes on debt utilization. First, we find a positive relation between marginal tax rates and the utilization of outside debt by both taxable and flowthrough entities, despite the possibility that owners of flow-through entities could achieve the optimal amount of debt-related tax shields by borrowing or lending in their personal accounts. One explanation for this result is the existence of significant non-tax impediments to creating the optimal amount of leverage in the owners' individual accounts. In sum, this evidence documents that the double taxation of dividends is not a necessary condition for taxes to influence debt utilization. Second, we test whether marginal tax rates influence the utilization of inside debt. We expect that marginal tax rates will not influence the utilization of inside debt for flow-through entities because the interest expense deduction will not generate any tax savings. A parallel analysis of taxable corporations strengthens our test of this conjecture. The results of this test suggest that marginal tax rates do not influence the utilization of inside debt for flow-through entities, but are positively related to the utilization of inside debt for taxable corporations. This finding is consistent with taxable corporations using inside debt to avoid the double taxation of corporate income that might otherwise be distributed to owners as dividends.
Finally, we test the tax substitution hypothesis (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) across combinations of entity type and type of debt. We test this hypothesis by interacting our tax rate variables with several types of non-debt expenses including officers' compensation. We expect and find evidence of substitution with respect to the use of outside debt for both taxable and flow-through entities. Similarly, because interest expense on inside debt is deductible for taxable corporations, we predict and find a significant substitution effect on inside debt utilization for taxable corporations. In contrast, because inside debt has no tax advantages for flow-through entities, we predict and find no significant substitution effect on inside debt utilization for flow-through entities.
Overall, the strength of our results is enhanced by testing predictions related to flow-through entities across separate samples of partnerships and electing Subchapter S corporations. Testing our predictions across two types of flow-through entities helps to rule out the possibility that our results might be confounded by entity characteristics other than taxes. Our results suggest that the tax and substitution hypotheses hold across taxable and flow-through entities for outside debt, but that tax incentives for inside debt vary across these two general types of firms. Further, these results suggest that an appropriate comparison for purposes of testing the tax and substitution hypotheses for outside debt is between high and low tax rate entities, not between taxable and flow-through entities. This finding is especially important considering the trend toward small businesses organizing as flow-through entities. Finally, our evidence suggests that closely held taxable corporations use inside debt, as well as other payments to owners such as officers' compensation, to avoid the corporate income tax. In addition to its policy implications, this latter finding contrasts with results of studies based on observations of publicly-traded corporations and partnerships, and illustrates that empirical findings based on samples of publiclytraded firms do not necessarily generalize to closely-held businesses.
